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Abstract 
 
We are concerned by the dynamic demographic and economic consequences of epidemics, 
and to this end, we consider a general overlapping generations model which allows for several 
epidemic configurations. People live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults 
and senior adults. A junior adult has an exogenous number of children and is perfectly 
altruistic in that is he only cares for the survival of his children and the social position they 
will get. He invests in his own health and education, and in the health and education of his 
children.  Because we take into account both child and adult mortality, we are in principle 
able to investigate the implications of epidemics for any age-mortality profile. First, we fully 
analytically characterise the short run and long run economic and demographic properties of 
the model, which allows us to do the same for the distributions of human capital and thus 
income. Second, we analyse the consequences of one-period long epidemics in two polar 
cases: an epidemic hitting only children Vs an epidemic only killing adults.  Both are shown 
to have permanent demographic and economic effects. In contrast to epidemics only killing 
children, ‘adult’ epidemics are additionally shown to distort the income distribution in the 
medium run, creating more poverty. Such distributional effects vanish in the long run. 
To analyse the medium term effects of HIV/AIDS, we assume that the epidemic hit junior 
adults, increase the number of deaths among children and reduces fertility. Then, we show 
that the size of the total population will decrease in the medium term, and that the share of the 
active population in the total population will also lower. In the active population, the 
proportion of people with a high level of human capital will decrease and the proportion 
holding a low level of human capital will increase. Finally output per worker and per capita 
will decrease. 
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inequality  
 
JEL Classification numbers: I1, I2, J1, O1 
 
                                                 
1 Department of economics and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain. boucekkine@core.ucl.ac.be 
2 University Paris I, PSE and CEPREMAP, Paris. laffargue@pse.ens.fr 
 1
1. Introduction 
Though the study of the economic effects of epidemics has always been of interest to many 
economists (see for example Hirshleifer, 1987), the more recent HIV/AIDS pandemic and its 
apparent massive demographic effects, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has suggested an 
exceptionally abundant empirical and theoretical economic literature. Unfortunately, there is 
no common view of either the short or long run consequences of such an epidemic on 
economic growth so far.  
On an empirical ground, the impact of AIDS on economic growth has been investigated in 
many studies3. Using cross-country data, Bloom and Mahal (1997) find a statistically 
insignificant coefficient on the AIDS variable and conclude that AIDS has had little impact 
on growth. The explanation seems to be that, by killing large numbers of people, AIDS is 
reducing population pressure on existing land and capital, thus raising labour productivity. It 
is possible that the 1980–1992 period examined in this study is too early in the epidemic to 
fully assess the effect of AIDS on growth. However, a more recent paper by Young (2005) 
comes to the even stronger conclusion that the AIDS epidemic will increase the per capita 
consumption and output of surviving people over the levels, which would have been reached 
without the epidemic.  
On the other hand McDonald and Roberts (2006) apply similar but more elaborated 
econometrics than Bloom and Mahal to the more recent period 1984-1999. These authors 
work with an elaboration of the Solow model where production uses four factors: labour, 
physical capital, health capital and education capital. This model is estimated on a panel of 
112 countries, over the period 1960 to 1998, with the data observed at 5 yearly intervals. 
Health capital per capita is measured by the life expectancy at birth or by the infant mortality 
rate. Both measurements give similar results. The authors conclude to a strong effect of the 
stock of general health on average income in developing countries. Average health itself 
depends on HIV/AIDS prevalence and the proportion of population at risk of malaria. They 
conclude that the marginal impact on income per capita of a 1% increase in HIV prevalence 
rate is minus 0.59% in Africa.   
Such a disagreement on the growth effects of AIDS is also apparent in the empirical literature 
which studies the impact of the Spanish flu (see the excellent work of Brainerd and Siegler, 
2003), and we will see that it goes with a similar discrepancy in the related theory.  
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However, disagreement does not extend to the demographic effects of AIDS in the medium 
term. HIV/AIDS primarily affects the most productive age group of men and women between 
15 and 49 years—the main breadwinners and heads of households raising families and 
supporting the elderly—and their children. All studies conclude that the total population of 
countries severely hit by AIDS will be much lower in 20 or 25 years than if the epidemic had 
not taken place. Figure 1 (United Nations, 2004) presents the projected population size from 
1995 to 2025, taking into account the demographic impact of AIDS as well as the hypothetical 
projected population without AIDS, for the 38 most affected African countries. In 1995, their 
population stood at 553 million, 6 million less than it would have been without AIDS. By 
2025, the population of these 38 African countries will reach 983 million, that is, 156 million 
(or 14 per cent) fewer than without AIDS. This number can be decomposed between 98 
million additional deaths between 1995 and 2025, and 58 million children who will not be born 
because of the early deaths of women of reproductive age. In the most severe case, Botswana, 
where currently more than one in three adults is HIV positive, population is expected to 
decline within the next few years 
 
Death affects more the adult population of working age than younger or older populations. 
However, the same study by the United Nations writes “Approximately one fourth to one 
third of children born to HIV-positive women are likely to acquire infection from their 
mothers.  Paediatric HIV infection is expected to have a substantial impact on mortality 
during infancy and childhood, particularly among older children (above age one)… Children 
who acquire the HIV virus from their mothers during childbirth or breast feeding usually do 
not survive long enough to enrol in school…. Children die young from HIV owing to mother-
to-child transmission and to the weakened ability of infected mothers to care for their infants 
and young children”. Cohen (1998) notes: “Child mortality rates are already higher today than 
they would have been without AIDS in some high prevalence countries. Thus child mortality 
rates are estimated as being 75% higher in Botswana in 1996. By the year 2010 child 
mortality rates are expected to be twice as high in Botswana, 4 times greater in Zimbabwe and 
about twice as high in Zambia and Malawi” (Figure 2). 
Finally, Figure 3 (United Nations, 2004) displays the age pyramid of Bostwana, the country 
with the highest adult HIV prevalence, in 2000 and as projected for 2025, with and without 
AIDS. In 2000, the impact of AIDS on the age structure of Bostwana’s population is still 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 For an excellent review see United Nations (2004). 
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mild. But by 2025, more than half of the potential population aged 35-59 would have been 
lost to AIDS. In comparison, one third of the population aged less than 15 years old is 
expected to be lost to AIDS. Cohen (2002) notes that for Malawi one of the most important 
consequences of AIDS is a change in the age pyramid of the population, with a narrowing of 
the distribution in the working age population, and a consequent problem with respect to age 
dependency, with larger numbers of youthful and elderly dependents.  
 
 At the theoretical level, the discrepancy in the evaluation of the effects of an epidemic on 
economic growth is especially neat in the benchmark growth models, as clearly reflected in 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), chapter 5. Two models are considered in this chapter. Both 
use two production factors:  physical capital and human capital. The economy is on a 
reference balanced growth path when an epidemic, which takes place at date 0, destroys a part 
of the human capital, but leaves physical capital intact. In the first model, the sector 
producing the human capital uses the same technology as the sector producing consumption 
goods and physical capital; it is therefore a one-sector model. However, investments in both 
factors must be non-negative (irreversibility). Then the epidemic creates an imbalance 
between the two factors. The economy reacts by setting the investment in physical capital to 
zero, but also by reducing households’ consumption. The correction of the imbalance and the 
reduction in consumption increase the growth rate of the production of the physical good 
above its reference value. Of course, this growth rate will decline monotonically over time 
until it reaches its initial value.  
The second case considered by Barro and Sala-I-Martin is the celebrated Lucas-Uzawa model 
(see for example Lucas, 1988).  Education, the sector producing human capital, only uses this 
factor as input. The production of consumption good and physical capital uses both factors.  
Then, an epidemic increases the scarcity of human capital, and the wage rate. The high cost of 
operation for the education sector will motivate people to allocate human capital to 
production of goods, rather than to education, the sector that produces the relatively scarce 
factor. This effect tends to retard the economy’s growth rate. The growth rate of gross output 
(including the production of new human capital) will decrease at the time of the epidemic, 
then it will increase monotonically over time until it reaches its reference value. 
 
Hence, the predictions of the two-sector model for economic growth are exactly the opposite 
of those of the one-sector prototype. Incidentally, the latter delivers the same prediction as the 
 4
even more standard Solow model. In such a model, the initial effect of an epidemic is to 
increase the amount of capital per worker and output per worker. After the initial shock, the 
economy will gradually converge back to its steady-state, and the growth rate of output per 
worker will be less than its steady state value during this transition. Despite the divergent 
predictions, all these textbook models have some common characteristics: 
 
(i) The disembodied nature of human capital 
All the models listed above consider that human capital, which aggregates the education 
level of the population and sometimes its health status, is similar to physical capital. 
However, human capital (education and health) is embodied in individuals, inducing 
possible big differences concerning the mechanisms of investment in physical capital. For 
instance, the death of a child or an elderly has no effect on the level of the human capital 
used in production. Its economic effects will be very different from the death of workers 
in their twenties or thirties, which brings the destruction of human capital progressively 
brought up in them through child rearing, formal education and learning on the job4.  
 
(ii) The importance of parental decisions in education and health expenditures 
Another specificity of the human capital (education and health) is that the amount of it 
embodied in a person strongly results from decisions taken by his parents. Bowles and 
Gentis (2002) quote a series of empirical results for the United States. A son born in the 
highest income decile has a probability of 22.9% to reach the same decile and a 
probability of 2.4% to reach the lowest income decile. A son born in the lowest income 
decile has a probability of 1.3% to reach the highest decile and a probability of 31.2% to 
reach the lowest decile. Grawe and Mulligan (2002) review cross-country evidence 
showing that countries with lower public provision of human capital experience smaller 
                                                 
4 Brainerd and Siegler make an interesting remark, which unfortunately they do not use in their quantitative 
analysis: « In a typical influenza epidemic, the majority of the victims are young children and the elderly, giving 
the age profile of mortality a distinct ‘U’ shape. A distinguishing characteristic of the 1918 epidemic was that it 
disproportionately killed men and women with ages 15 to 44, so that the age profile of mortality instead 
followed a ‘W’ pattern. … For both whites and non whites, the male mortality rate for those ages 15 to 44 
exceeded the female mortality rate by 50-75 per cent in 1918, in contrast to the non-epidemic years in which the 
death rates by gender are virtually identical. The death rate for non whites also exceeds that of whites, although 
the ‘W’ pattern characterises the age-specific death rates of both races”. 
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intergenerational mobility. For instance, less developed countries exhibit strong 
intergenerational transmission. The connection between the absence of intergenerational 
mobility and education is well documented. Bowles and Gentis show that this situation 
can also be linked to the health of children, which is itself a function of their parents’ 
income (see also Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2001).  
 One important implication of property (ii) is the following: when young adults die, not only 
do they reduce the amount of labour and human capital used in production, but they also leave 
orphans behind them. To show how this effect can be disastrous, we can quote the following 
extract of an article published by The Economist (2003) ``… one-in-ten sub-Saharan children 
is now an orphan. A third of these are the result of AIDS. Orphaning rates above 5% worry 
UNICEF because they exceed the capacity of local communities to care for parentless 
children. So do places such as Zambia, where almost 12% of children are AIDS orphans…. 
Orphans tend to be poorer than non orphans, and to face a higher risk of malnutrition, stunting 
and death — even if they are free of HIV themselves. Orphans are less likely to attend school 
because they cannot afford the fees but also because step-parents tend to educate their own 
children first”. Case, Pakson and Ableidinger (2004) give interesting complements to this 
view. Orphans live in foster families who discriminate against them and in favour of the 
children of the family head. The probability of the school enrolment of an orphan is inversely 
proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the household head. Gertler, Levine 
and Martinez (2003) show that parental loss does not operate only through a reduction in 
household resources. Parental presence, including the loss of mentoring, the transmission of 
values and emotional and psychological support, plays an important role in investment in 
child human capital. 
The report by the United Nations (2004) adds that the health and nutritional status of orphans 
are also likely to suffer. In a study of 312 communities in 13 Indonesian provinces, it was 
found that children whose mothers had died were more likely to die than children who had 
not lost a parent. Bereaved children were generally less healthy than children whose parents 
had lived. In a study of children’s health in the north-western United Republic of Tanzania, it 
was found that adult deaths led to increased morbidity and reduced height for age of children 
under five in the household. Finally the report notes: “The effects of lowered investment in 
the human capital of the younger generation will affect economic performance over future 
decades, well beyond the time frame of most economic analyses”. 
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Our paper deals with the economic and demographic effects of AIDS in the medium term that 
is one generation after the time when the epidemics started and in a period when the number 
of death has lowered5. Few studies investigate this horizon, and prefer focusing on the short 
term or the long run. We will especially be interested by the modifications in inequality that 
AIDS will induce in the medium term. 
Our paper develops a discrete time, perfect foresight endogenous growth model of a small 
open economy which incorporates the two crucial aspects of human capital formation 
mentioned above. Hereafter, we shall take human capital in the broad sense of education and 
health. The demographic and economic properties of the model are fully analytically 
investigated, which is yet a contribution to the literature as it will be clear in the next review 
section. In our model, people live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults and 
senior adults. A junior adult has an exogenous number of children and is perfectly altruistic 
that is he only cares for the survival of his children and the social position they will get. He 
invests in his own health and education, and in the health and education of his children. The 
probability for a child to reach a high level of human capital is independent of the levels of 
the human capital of his parent, under the conditions that he survives and that his parent 
survives and is able to bring him up. Thus, we have eliminated the traditional channel of the 
cultural heritage to focus on alternative channels which work through education and health 
and investments in both. The probabilities of survival of a child and of a junior adult depend 
on the amounts of money spent by the junior adult for his own human capital and for the one 
of his children.  
The credit market is incomplete: parents cannot finance spending on their children by 
borrowing against their higher expected income, which will result from this spending. So, 
health and education spending and the probabilities of survival will be low if parents are poor.  
Moreover, if a parent dies and if his children become orphans, their probabilities of survival 
will be lowered. Finally, we will assume that an orphan has a lower probability to reach a 
high level of human capital than a child brought up by living parents.  
An interesting feature of our paper is to distinguish the mortality of children from that of 
parents, each depending on specific education and health spending. Investing in his children 
human capital will increase their survival rate until they reach the age when they can 
                                                 
5 The United Nations report gives the estimated and projected excess deaths due to AIDS in the 53 countries 
where the rates of prevalence are the highest, from 1990 to 2025. The number of deaths increases at an 
increasing rate until 2003. Then it increases at a decreasing rate, reaches a maximum in 2022 or 2023, and 
decreases afterward.   
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procreate, and so will contribute to increase the growth rate of population. Of course the ratio 
between the active and inactive population that is between junior adults and children will 
depend on the amounts of money spent on the education and health of these two kinds of 
population.  
Another feature of the paper is to consider a new dimension of inequality, namely inequality 
in front of death. Inequality between children has several causes. First, the children of less 
educated parents who have survived and who bring them up have a higher probability of 
dying before growing adults because their parents spend less on their health and education. 
Secondly, less educated parents spend less on their own education and health and have a 
higher probability to die and to be unable to bring their children up. Orphans have a higher 
probability of dying young, and if they survive of being less educated.  
We shall define an epidemic as an increase in the death rate of a generation of people lasting 
for only one period. We consider two kinds of epidemics. The first one kills a given 
proportion of children while the second kills a proportion of junior adults. We shall show that 
the two epidemics have completely different dynamic demographic and economic 
implications. Ultimately, we will build a relatively simple but quite global economic theory of 
epidemics with embodied human capital and with a comprehensive accounting of inequality 
in front of death.  
The paper is organised as follows. The second section reviews the related literature to clarify 
our contributions. The third section presents the model and its short run equilibrium. The 
model has a property of decomposability. The equilibrium values of the choices of the agents 
can be computed first. These values contribute to the determination of the sizes of the various 
populations, but are independent of them. The fourth section is devoted to the transitory 
dynamics and the long run equilibrium of demographic variables. The fifth section 
investigates the economic and demographic effects of an epidemic hitting either children or 
junior adults. Then it tries to evaluate the medium-terms effects of AIDS by combining the 
effects of these two kinds of epidemic and of a reduction in fertility. The sixth section 
concludes. 
 
2. Relation to the existing literature 
There are several papers developing computable general equilibrium models to investigate the 
effects of AIDS, and giving an important role to the increase in the number of orphans. For 
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example, Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003) develop such a model applied to the South 
African case. The authors emphasise the formation of human capital and transmission 
mechanism across generations and conclude to a very negative effect of the epidemic on long-
run growth, with a large proportion of families and their offspring falling in a poverty trap. 
So, a transitory shock can have permanent effects.  
 
A similar model was developed by Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2004), who also conclude 
that the growth effects of AIDS are large. The policies investigated by the authors are to make 
AIDS patients well enough to live more or less normal and productive lives, which would 
include being more able to care for their children. However, the authors conclude that such 
policies such as changing subsidies for AIDS related medical care have relatively small 
growth effects. In their paper, children receive a different level of education if their parents 
are healthy or ill. However, when they grow up and become adult, the available human capital 
of their cohort is reallocated in an egalitarian way between all its members. This 
redistribution, which forsakes the assumption of embodiment of the investment in education, 
simplifies the simulation of the model, but contradicts the optimisation program of the parents 
that does not anticipate it. In the paper by Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach children are ranked 
by increasing human capital then divided into a finite number of classes. The reallocation of 
the human capital occurs inside each of these classes. Thus, these authors approximate a 
continuous distribution by a discrete distribution. As this approximation can be as precise as 
desired, this solution is more acceptable than the previous one. 
 
Our paper takes a broader perspective: we are concerned by the dynamic and long run 
demographic and economic consequences of epidemics, and to this end, we consider a general 
model which allows for several epidemic configurations. In particular, because we take into 
account both child and adult mortality, we are in principle able to investigate the implications 
of epidemics for any age-mortality profile. In order to derive fully analytical results, we shall 
precisely tackle two polar cases: an epidemic hitting only children Vs an epidemic only 
killing adults. The comparison of these two cases will be eloquent enough. Moreover, our 
treatment of human capital formation meets the two crucial characteristics outlined in the 
introduction (roughly, embodiment and ‘paternalism’). 
Finally it should be noted that the papers focusing on AIDS usually comment on the changes 
in the distributions of human capital and income possibly following the epidemic although 
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they do not fully investigate them. The only theoretical paper we know, which investigates 
the links between health spending, mortality and the persistence of inequality across 
generations, is by Chakraborty and Das (2005). These authors base their analysis of the 
persistence of poverty on the fact that poor parents invest less in their own health and so have 
a high probability of dying. Thus, they save little and leave to their children a small bequest if 
they survive and a still smaller bequest if they die. The paper assumes that parents only care 
for the health of their children if they are themselves alive when their children grow. 
However, parents cannot buy annuities against the saving they will leave in the case of their 
premature death (so, in this situation, children get an unplanned bequest). An extension of the 
paper introduces the possibility of investing, not only in the health of parents, but in the 
education of children too. The productivity of labour depends on both these investments. 
Nonetheless, these authors do not consider investments in the health of children nor their 
survival probability. 
3. The model: behaviour of the agents and temporary equilibrium 
We consider a discrete time, perfect foresight dynamic model of a small open economy. 
People live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults and senior adults. We will 
start by examining the choices of a junior adult in an given period denoted t . In a second 
paragraph we will describe the temporary equilibrium of the model in this period. To ease the 
exposition and to be able to bring out a fully analytical characterization,  we shall refer to a 
single good, health care. The latter should be taken in the much broader sense of any 
investment raising human capital (including education).  
 
3.1. The choices of a junior adult 
A junior adult enters period t  with an endowment in human capital h . Healthcare is the only 
good existing in the economy. It is produced by firms, which use human capital as their 
unique input and which operate under constant returns. We will assume that the productivity 
of human capital is equal to 1 and that firms make no profit. Thus, h  can also be interpreted 
as the earnings of the agent. The agent sets his saving s  and his investment in health l  for the 
period, under the budget constraint  
(1) lsh +=  
 
 10
Spending on health has an effect on the lifetime of the agent. His probability of being alive in 
period 1+t  (as a senior adult) is )(lπ . At the end of period t  the agent will have an 
exogenous number n  of children. Senior adults receive no wages. This assumption will 
simplify the model in directions that we are not very interested to investigate. The agent will 
invest 1+e  in the health of each of his children. The probability for each of them to be alive at 
the beginning of period 2+t  will depend on this investment. If the agent is alive in period 
1+t  and can take care of his children, this probability will be )( 1+eλ . If he is dead and if his 
children are orphans, this probability will be )( 1+ecλ , with 10 <≤< cc .  The saving of the 
agent in period t , s , is lent on the international capital market at the exogenous and constant 
capitalisation rate 1>R . The budget constraint of the agent in period 1+t  is: 
(2) 1+= neRs  
We notice that the amount invested by the agent in the health of his children will be the same 
if the agent dies or stays alive at the end of period t . This investment is equal to the 
capitalisation of the saving made in period t . The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent 
is 
(3) 1++= nelRRh  
To simplify the model we will assume that human capital can take only two values: −h  and 
+h , with: +− << hh0 . We will assume that a child who has living parents and who stays alive 
has a probability p  of obtaining a human capital of +h  and a probability p−1  of obtaining a 
human capital of −h . An orphan who stays alive has the probability q  of obtaining the high 
level of human capital and q−1  of obtaining the low level of human capital. We assume that 
10 ≤<≤ pq . 
 
Our junior adult has the following utility function in period t  
(4) [ ] [ ] [ ]{ }−−+−−++ +−−++−≡ hhhqclhhhplenU )()(1)()()( 1 νπνπλ  
The junior adult is wholly altruistic. His utility only depends on the expected human capital 
accumulated by his children who will reach the adult age. If the junior adult reaches the age 
of senior adult, he will bring his children up, which will increase their probability of survival 
and their expected levels of human capital. +hν  ( −hν ) represents the satisfaction a child 
brings to his parent when he reaches the adult age with the level of human capital +h  ( −h ). 
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We assume that 0>ν . When the child dies this satisfaction is 0. We will introduce the 
following notations 
(5) [ ]−−+ +−= hhhpr )(1 ν , [ ]−−+ +−= hhhqcr )(2 ν  and 1/ 21 −= rrr . 
The utility function of our junior adult in period t  becomes, after having removed a constant 
multiplicative term, [ ]1)()( 1 +≡ + rleU πλ . r  represents the premium in satisfaction brought 
by children, when their parent stays alive, or if one prefers, the utility for parents of staying 
alive. In this case, the probability of survival of each child is higher (by a factor c/1 ) and his 
expected level of human capital is higher too. r , is an increasing function of the inequality in 
earnings, −−+ − hhh /)( , which is expected for the next period. In the following exercises of 
comparative static, we will assume that h  and r  can change independently. Finally, our 
junior adult must solve in period t  the program 
(6) [ ]1)()( 1, 1 +++ rleMaxel πλ  
1++= nelRRh  
  0, 1 ≥+el  
Before solving this program we must give precise specifications of the survival functions:  
(7)  )1/()()( 111 αλ α −= −++ Aee , if ( ) )1/(11 10 αα −+ −≤≤ Ae  
1)( 1 =+eλ , if ( ) )1/(11 1 αα −+ −≥Ae  
 (8) )1/()()( 1 βπ β −= −Bll , if ( ) )1/(110 ββ −−≤≤ Bl  
1)( =lπ , if ( ) )1/(11 ββ −−≥Bl  
with: 1,0 << αβ , 0, >BA . In the rest of the paper we will assume that we are always inside 
the intervals where both functions are strictly increasing. Deaton (2003) notices that health 
spending, the health state and the longevity of an individual are increasing and concave 
functions of his income: for instance the probability for somebody of dying between the ages 
of 50 and 60 is a decreasing convex function of his income. This concavity is a possible 
explanation of the impact of inequality on the average health state in a country, and it implies 
that some redistribution of income can increase average health.  
With the survival functions given above, program (6) becomes 
(9) [ ] )1/(1)1/()()( 111, 1 αββα −+−−−++ BlrAeMaxel  
1++= nelRRh  
0, 1 ≥+el ,  ( ) )1/(11 1 αα −+ −≤Ae , ( ) )1/(11 ββ −−≤Bl  
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We make the following assumptions 
Assumption 1. The parameters of the model must satisfy the constraints 
(10) ( ) ( )

 +−
−+−≤ −+ rBh /11
1
111 )1/(1 β
αβ β  
(11) ( ) )1/(11 αα −+ −≤
R
nAh  
This assumption is needed to guarantee the solvability of the optimisation problem 
considered. Now, we can establish the following lemmas. Lemma 1 is precisely about the 
latter property. 
Lemma 1. Program (9) has a unique solution defined by the two equations 
(12) β
αα
β −
−+=−− − 1
11
)(
1
1Blrl
h  
(13) )(1 lhn
Re −=+  
Proof. Equation (13) is the constraint in program (9). We use this constraint to eliminate 1+e  
from the objective function.  Equation (12) is the first order conditions of the so-transformed 
objective function. Let us define the function β
α
−
−−≡ 1)(
1)(
Blrl
hly . We have +∞=)0(y , 
β
αα
β −
−+<−−= − 1
11
)(
11)( 1Bhr
hy , 0)( =+∞y . )(ly has a unique minimum, which is negative, for 
ββ
βα
−
−−=
1
)1)(1(
Brhl . Thus, equation (12) defines a unique value for l , which is positive 
and smaller than h .  
We have to check that this solution satisfies ( ) )1/(11 ββ −−≤Bl . This is equivalent to 
( )[ ] )1/()1(1/1 )1/(1 βαβ β −−+≤− − By  , which results from inequality (10). We also have to 
check that ( ) )1/(11 1)( αα −+ −≤−= lhn
RAAe  or ( ) )1/(11 αα −−−≥ R
nAhAl . This condition is 
satisfied because of inequality (11).   
The two following lemmas describe in detail the characteristics of the optimal decisions taken 
by a junior adult, first concerning investment in his own health, then concerning investment in 
the health of his offspring.  
Lemma 2. a) A well-endowed junior adult invests more in his health than a poorly endowed 
junior adult. b) The investment of a junior adult in his own health increases with his earnings 
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and when there is an increase in the utility for parents of being alive. c) The investment of a 
junior adult in his own health increases with the scale parameter of his survival function. d) 
The investment of a junior adult in his own health is independent of the scale parameter of the 
survival function of his children.  
Proof.  We use the following equation β
αα
β −
−+=−−≡ − 1
11
)(
1)( 1Blrl
hly , which determines l  
and the properties of the function )(ly , which were established in the proof of lemma 1.   
 
Lemma 3. a) A well-endowed junior adult invests more in the health of his children than a 
poorly endowed junior adult. His total investment is independent of the number of his 
children. b) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children increases with his 
earnings and decreases when there is an increase in the utility for parents of being alive. c) 
The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children decreases with the scale 
parameter of his survival function. d) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his 
children is independent of the scale parameter of the survival function of these children.   
 
Proof. We use the results of the previous lemma and either the expression of  1+ne , which is 
given by equation (13), or the following expression, which results from a combination of 
equations (12) and (13) 

 +−−= −+ β
β
βα 11 1)1( rB
llRne .  
The model has several worth-mentioning properties. First, and as announced in the 
introduction section, our model entails inequality in front of death. Children of parents with 
low human capital have a higher probability of dying before growing. Moreover, such parents 
tend to spend less in their own health care (and education), and hence face a lower survival 
probability with the subsequent negative effect on the human capital of the resulting orphans.  
Second, the investment decisions taken by the junior adults are sensitive to exogenous 
changes in their survival function (Property c of Lemma 2 and 3) but not to shifts in the 
survival function of their children (Property d of Lemma 2 and 3). Put in other words, an 
epidemic hitting young adults will have an impact on the investment decisions of these 
individuals while an epidemic hitting their own children will not.  
The consequences of varying life expectancy are extensively studied in the literature. Our 
model has some interesting predictions regarding this issue. In the standard theory relying on 
Blanchard-Yaari structures, life expectancy (or the mortality rate) is exogenous. A downward 
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shift in life expectancy generally decreases the marginal return to investment in this 
framework, implying less investment either in physical capital (as in the standard Blanchard 
model, 1985) and/or human capital (as in Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro, 2002). In our 
model, life expectancy is no longer exogenous. When an epidemic shortens the life 
expectancy of junior adults, healthcare expenditure decreases for reasons similar to the ones 
we just gave and life expectancy decreases by more than what results from the direct effect of 
the epidemic.   
Actually, our set-up has more subtle predictions concerning children’s health care: first, 
health care expenditures in the benefit of children go up under ‘adult’ epidemics, and second, 
the investment decisions of the parents are sensitive to a drop in their own life expectancy but 
not to a drop in the life expectancy of their children.  The first property is very easy to accept 
given the age specificity of the epidemic considered. The second property could be 
challenged. For example one could think that he should increase his health expenditures in the 
benefit of his children when they are subject to an age specific epidemic, precisely because 
his utility is entirely determined by the expected human capital accumulated by children who 
will reach the adult age. Nonetheless, because his lifetime earnings are pre-determined, such 
an increase in the health expenditures of children would imply a decrease in his own health 
care. Such a trade-off would arise in any model where children have no direct contribution to 
households’ earnings: a child-specific epidemic does not affect earnings, and so rising health 
expenditure in favour of children is necessarily detrimental to adults’ or elderly’ health care.  
In our model, the trade-off is settled in the most neutral way: no extra health care for none.   
 
The next section is devoted to the explicit study of the dynamics of populations and income 
distributions induced by these properties. Indeed, one of the important advantages of our 
simplified set-up is to allow for a full analytical appraisal of the latter dynamics. Before, we 
shall close the model and present its temporary equilibrium. 
 
3.2. The temporary equilibrium of the model 
The equilibrium values of investments in health by well-endowed or poorly-endowed junior 
adults are given by equations (12) and (13), where we only have to specify the respective 
endowment in human capital, +h  or −h , of these agents. The savings of both kinds of junior 
adults, +s  and −s , can easily be derived from equation (2). 
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3.2.1. Demographic variables 
The population alive in period t  includes +2N  and −2N  junior adults with human capital 
endowments respectively equal to +h  and −h . It also includes +3N  and −3N  senior adults. 
Finally, it includes +1N  , −1N  children who have parents with respective human capital  +h  , 
−h , and +oN 1  , −oN 1  orphans with respectively high and low bequests. The parents of the two 
first kinds of children are the senior adults of the period. So, we have: 
(14) ++ = 31 nNN  and  −− = 31 nNN  
The populations +oN 1  , −oN 1 , +2N , −2N , +3N  and −3N  are predetermined in period t . The 
number of well-endowed (poorly-endowed) senior adults which will be alive in period 1+t  is 
equal to the number of junior adults with the same endowment who are alive in period t , time 
their rate of survival  
(15) ++++ = 231 )( NlN π ,  −−−+ = 231 )( NlN π  
If we use equation (14) in period 1+t  (notice that the total number of children in this period 
is equal to the number of junior adults in period t  times n ), we get the equations  
(16) ++
++
+ −= 31211 nNnNN o  and −+−−+ −= 31211 nNnNN o  
The numbers of well-endowed and poorly-endowed junior adults in period 1+t  are 
(17) ( ) ( )−−−+++++ +++= oo qcNpNeqcNpNeN 111121 )()( λλ , 
 ( ) ( ) ++−−−+++−+ −+++= 21111121 )()( NcNNecNNeN oo λλ  
 
3.2.2. Balance of trade and international borrowing 
In period t , human capital in the country is equal to −−++ + hNhN 22 . This expression also 
gives the quantity of health good domestically produced that is domestic output. The national 
demand for health good is −−−+++−−++ +++++ eNNeNNlNlN ào )()( 111122 . The excess of 
supply over demand is equal to the surplus of the trade balance BT . If we use equations (1), 
(2), (14), (15) and (16) we can write this surplus as 
(18) ( ) ( ) [ ]RslNslNRsNsNsNsNBT −−−−−−+−+−+−−−−+−+−−++ −+−−−−+= 11211121131322 ))(1())(1( ππ  
The first term represents saving by junior adults. The second term represents the disaving 
(interests included) by senior adults. The last term represents the disaving of the dead, or if 
one prefers by the orphans.  
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If we use equation (13) this expression can be rewritten 
(19) ( ) ( )RsNsNsNsNBT −−−−+−+−−−++ +−+= 12112122  
The second term of the right-hand side represents assets held by nationals at the beginning of 
period t . The first term represents assets held by nationals at the end of period t . They will 
be inflated by the factor R  at the beginning of period 1+t . Thus, national assets grow at the 
same rate as the population of junior adults. We will show that in the steady state this rate is 
lower than n , the number of children by junior adults, and we will assume that Rn < . So, the 
discounted value of national assets (debt) will tend to 0 when time increases indefinitely. 
 
4. Dynamics and long run equilibrium 
We will start by examining the equations giving the dynamics of populations. Then, in a 
second paragraph, we will investigate the properties of this dynamics, when the environment 
of the economics is kept unchanged.  
 
4.1. The dynamics of populations 
There are +2N  and −2N  junior adults alive in period 0≥t . They will have n  children each. 
These children will either become ++
2
2N  and 
−
+
2
2N  junior adults with earnings respectively 
equal to +h  and −h  in period 2+t , or they will die at the end of period 1+t . 2+D  represents 
the supplementary number of junior adults who would exist in period t  if no children die 
before reaching the age of junior adult, that is if the survival rate function λ  were identical to 
1. We will investigate the dynamics of the model for 2≥t . The states of the economy in 
periods 0 and 1 are assumed to be given.  We have the fundamental relationship: 
 
(20) 
















−−−−
=







Α=







−
+
−
+
+
−
+
+
+
D
N
N
n
aaaa
aa
aa
D
N
N
n
D
N
N
2
2
22122111
2221
1211
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
111
0
0
 
 
with  
[ ]{ }cqlplea )(1)()( 111 ++++ −+= ππλ  
[ ]{ })1()(1)1)(()( 121 qclplea −−+−= ++++ ππλ  
[ ]{ }cqlplea )(1)()( 112 −−−+ −+= ππλ  
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[ ]{ }))1()(1)1)(()( 122 qclplea −−+−= −−−+ ππλ  
 
and with )0(2+N , )0(2−N  and )0(D  given if t  is even and )1(2+N , )1(2−N  and )1(D  given if 
t  is odd. 
Lemma 1, 2 and 3 imply that these parameters satisfy the constraints 10 1112 <<< aa , 
10 2122 <<< aa , 121112212 <+<+ aaaa  and 
[ ] 0)()()()()( 1121122211 >−−=− −+−+++ lleeqpcaaaa ππλλ . 
 
The elements of each column of Α  are positive and sum to 1. So they can be interpreted as 
proportions, or as conditional probabilities for instance for a child of a well-endowed junior 
adult to be well-endowed or poorly-endowed or dead two periods later.  
More precisely, 1211 aa −  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a high 
level of human capital if his parent is well-endowed versus if his parent is poorly-endowed. 
2221 aa −  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a low level of human 
capital if his parents are well-endowed versus if his parents are poorly endowed. The 
difference between the probabilities for a child to die if his parents are well-endowed versus if 
his parents are poorly endowed is )()( 22211211 aaaa −−−− . The fate of children is 
independent of the social position of their parents when 022211211 =−=− aaaa . 
Matrix Α  in period t  only depends on health spending set by junior adults, +l , −l , ++1e  and 
−
+1e . These spending are functions of the values taken by a series of exogenous variables in 
period t : the foreign interest rate R , the scale parameters of the survival functions of children 
and young adults A  and B , the incomes of the junior adults +h and −h  and the number of 
their children n .  
 
Equation (20) gives the dynamics of the numbers of junior adults and of the dead, +2N , −2N  
and D  for 2≥t , when the values of these variables are given in periods 0 and 1. Equation 
(15) gives the dynamics of the numbers of senior adults +−
++ = 213 )( NlN π ,  −−−− = 213 )( NlN π  
for 1≥t . Equation (14) gives the dynamics of the number of non orphan children ++ = 31 nNN  
and −− = 31 nNN  for 1≥t . Finally, the numbers of orphans in period 1≥t  are given by 
equations (16) ++
++
+ −= 31211 nNnNN o  and −+−−+ −= 31211 nNnNN o . 
 18
 
We define DNNP ++= −+ 22   as the potential population of junior adults. It would be equal 
to the effective population if all children reached the age of junior adult. Equation (20) shows 
that this potential population grows at rate n : 222 nPP =+ . The number of dead people is equal 
to the difference between the potential population and the number of junior adults: 
)( 22 −+ +−= NNPD . Thus, we just have to investigate the dynamics of the numbers of living 
junior adults +2N  and −2N , which is given by 
(21) 






=


Β=



+
+
−
+
−
+
−
+
)(
)(
)(
)(
)2(
)2(
2
2
2221
1211
2
2
2
2
tN
tN
n
aa
aa
tN
tN
n
tN
tN  
with )0(2+N  and )0(2−N  given if t  is even and )1(2+N  and )1(2−N  given if t  is odd. In the 
rest of the paper we will assume that t  is even. 
 
4.2. Characterization of the demographic dynamics  
We will assume in this section that all the parameters and exogenous variables stay constant 
over time for 0≥t . We will also assume that t  is even. Then, matrix Α  will stay constant 
over time, and the dynamics of the model will be limited to the sizes of the various 
components of population (including the dead). Let us introduce the new variable 
 (22) 04)()(4)( 2112
2
221121122211
2
2211 >+−=−−+≡∆ aaaaaaaaaa  
We have the lemma 
Lemma 4. a) The eigenvalues of matrix Β , 1ρ  and 2ρ , are real and such that 
01 21 >>> ρρ . Their expressions are  
(23) 2/)( 22111 ∆++= aaρ   and 2/)( 22112 ∆−+= aaρ  
 
b) Let us denote by 


=
21
11
1 v
v
V and 


=
22
12
2 v
v
V  the right-hand column eigenvectors of  Β  and 
by ( )21 VVV =  the matrix of these eigenvectors. A determination of these eigenvectors is  
 (24) 



∆++−∆+−
−=
11221122
1212 22
aaaa
aa
V  
1V  can be normed such that its components are positive and sum to 1. 2V can be normed such 
that its first component is negative, its second component is positive and the sum of both 
components is equal to 1. 
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c) Let 


=
2221
1211
ww
ww
W  be the inverse of V : IVW = . Then, we have  
(25) 



∆−+−
∆++−
∆= 121122
121122
12 2
2
4
1
aaa
aaa
a
W  
 
d) The elements of matrix W  satisfy the constraints  
(26) 01211 >> ww  and 2221 0 ww <<    
 
The proof is in the appendix. We can now establish the following crucial proposition which 
neatly characterizes the demographic dynamics and the evolution of human capital (and thus 
income) distributions over time. 
 
Proposition 1. Assume, to fix the ideas,  that )0()0( 22 −+ + NN =1. Then: 
a) The dynamic paths followed by the sizes of the cohorts of both kinds of junior adults, are 
linear combinations of two geometric series with rates equal to the growth rate of potential 
population n  times  the eigenvalues of matrix Β   
(27) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ])0()0()0()0()2( 2222211212/22122111112/12 −++−+++ +++=+ NwNwvnNwNwvntN tt ρρ  
(28) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ])0()0()0()0()2( 2222212212/22122112112/12 −++−++− +++=+ NwNwvnNwNwvntN tt ρρ  
In the long run the populations of both kinds of junior adults will grow at a rate equal to the 
growth rate of the  potential population of junior adults times  the largest eigenvalue of 
matrix Β  (which is smaller than 1). The long run size of each group depends on the initial 
condition, )0(2+N . However, the long run proportions of the two groups of junior adults are 
independent of the initial conditions, and are precisely proportional to the two components of 
the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of matrix Β . 
 
b) Let us assume that its share of junior adults holding a high level of human capital in the 
initial population is decreased. In the long run, the sizes of both groups of junior adults will 
drop. In the short run, the number of junior adults holding a high level of human capital and 
the total size of the population of junior adults will unambiguously go down. In contrast, the 
number of junior adults holding a low level of human capital may increase in the short run. 
 
 20
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 1 has several important implications, which will be 
illustrated later on in our application to epidemics next section. First of all, Property a) shows 
the ability of the model to generate hysteresis. This should not be though seen as a surprising 
result: this is a natural outcome in demographic models: initial demographic shocks are likely 
to have long lasting echo effects. Such effects may be dampened after a while, for example if 
fertility markedly changes some generations after the initial shock, but it seems out of 
question that persistence is a fundamental property of demographic dynamics. Second, our 
model features that an initial change in the income distribution of the population may distort 
this distribution in the short and medium terms but not in the long run. This is a very 
important property as we will see in the application to epidemics. Actually, one of the debates 
around AIDS (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) is its impact on income inequality either in 
the short or long run. Our benchmark model delivers a very clear message in this respect as 
explained hereafter.  
5. The demographic and economic effects of epidemics  
We define an epidemic as an increase in the death rate of a generation of people lasting for 
only one period. Two kinds of epidemics will be considered in this paper. First, the scale 
parameter A  of the survival function of children is decreased by a fixed amount. Secondly, the 
parameter B  of the survival function of junior adults is decreased. The epidemic hits people 
irrespectively of their endowment in human capital or of their social background. We will 
assume that nothing can be done against the epidemic itself and the number of death it 
directly causes. In both cases, we will start from a reference balanced growth path with a total 
population of junior adults equal to 1.  
We first define precisely such a balanced path. We can deduce from the expressions of 
matrices V and W  given in Lemma 4 that 121121111 =+ vwvw , and 021221121 =+ vwvw . Assume 
that the initial population of junior adults, )0()0( 22 −+ + NN , is equal to 1, and suppose we 
norm eigenvector 1V   in such a way that the sum of its two components is equal to 1. If the 
vector of the initial values of the populations of the two kinds of junior adults is equal to the 
eigenvector of the transition matrix associated to its largest eigenvalue 12
2
)0(
)0(
V
N
N =



−
+
,  the 
population of junior adults will follow the balanced growth path  
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+ ρ  
Proposition 1 shows that this steady state is relatively asymptotically stable. This will be our 
reference balanced growth path. We now move to our analysis of epidemics. For a better 
understanding, recall that total domestic output in our model is given by  
(30) −−++ += htNhtNtY )()()( 22  .  
 
5.1. An epidemic hitting children 
The epidemic takes place in period 1 and kills a given proportion of children. So, the 
population of junior adults alive in period 2 will be reduced by the same proportion. However, 
the ratio between the numbers of well-endowed and poorly endowed junior adults will be 
unchanged. The second effect will be that the population of junior adults will be reduced by a 
constant proportion in every even period by the children, grandchildren, etc. who will not be 
born because of the death of their forebear. Domestic output will be reduced by the same 
proportion in even periods.  
Let us investigate the problem at a more formal level. The value of parameter A  is decreased 
by 0<dA  in period 1. According to Lemma 2 and 3 junior adults do not change their 
investment decisions. Equations (20) and (21) show that matrix Β  is reduced by a factor 
AdA /)1( α−  in period 0. So, the populations of both kinds of senior adults in every even 
period starting in period 2 is reduced by the same proportion. These populations remain 
unchanged in odd periods. 
Equations (14), (15) and (16) show that in even periods the numbers of senior adults and of 
children of each category, are unchanged. These numbers are reduced by the factor 
AdA /)1( α−  in odd periods starting in period 3. The only demographic change in period 1 is 
the death of children caused by the epidemic. Thus, the third consequence of the epidemic of 
period 1 is an echo effect, which permanently changes the demographic structure of the 
population. The share of junior adults is reduced in every even period and increased in every 
odd period. Thus, even if domestic output per worker remains the same in these periods, 
domestic output per capita decreases in even periods and increases in odd periods.   
 As we can see, such an epidemic has some important demographic and economic effects 
either in the short or long run by inducing a permanent demographic composition effect and a 
change in output per capita (but not per worker). Nonetheless, the epidemic is shown to be 
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neutral at all temporal horizons in terms of the income distribution among junior adults. The 
next section shows that ‘adult’ epidemics can in contrast distort such a distribution. 
 
5.2. An epidemic hitting junior adults 
The epidemic takes place in period 0 and kills a proportion of junior adults at the end of the 
period.  The number of children alive in period 1 will be unchanged but the proportion of 
orphans among them will be higher. The number of senior adults alive in period 1 will be 
lower as a result of the epidemic. So, in the model, the value of parameter B  is decreased by 
0<dB  in period 06. Junior adults living in this period perfectly understand the consequences 
of the epidemic when they make their decisions. They will reduce their investment in their 
own health, and their survival rates at the end of the period will decrease by more than what 
results from the epidemic. Junior adults will also increase their investment in the health of 
their children in period 1, which will improve the survival rates of children in period 1. Thus, 
matrix Β  has been changed in period 0, and consequently the populations of junior adults in 
period 2. The relative variations in the populations of juniors adults holding a high level and a 
low level of human capital, in this period is  
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The relative changes in the total population of junior adults and in the domestic output per 
worker are 
(33) 
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6 The assumption that the decrease in the value of parameter B  that is in the probability of survival, is the same 
for junior adults with a high as with a low level of human capital, is debatable. There are indications that people 
with a relatively high schooling level are more exposed to the risk of being hit by AIDS because they have more 
sexual partners (Cogneau and Grimm, 2005). There are also indications that these people are more aware of the 
risks of AIDS than less educated people and understand faster the usefulness of not engaging in risky behaviour, 
for instance they are more responsive to campaigns of information,  and prevention (de Walque, 2004).The 
United Nations (2004) quotes several studies showing that poor and uneducated people are more likely to 
engage in risky behaviour and to acquire HIV/AIDS. 
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The following lemma is an extension of lemmas 2 and 3. 
Lemma 5. Let us consider a junior adult with endowment h , and a decrease in the coefficient 
of his survival function by 0<dB . His probability of survival and the probability of survival 
of each of his children will change by 
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Proof. We deduce from equation (13)  
lh
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e
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1
1 .  
We deduce from equation (12)  
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)1)(1(2 1 <

 ++−−=−−=

 −−+ − B
dB
l
h
B
dB
Blrl
dl
l
h βαββαβαβ β . 
If we differentiate equation (8) and use the previous equation we get equation (35). We 
deduce from equation (7) 
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If we substitute the above expression of ldl /  we get equation (36). - 
 
An epidemic decreases the probability of survival of junior adults, first because it increases 
the death rate of this population, secondly because it reduces the spending of this population 
on its own health. This epidemic increases the probability of survival of children 
(conditionally on the facts that they are orphans or that their parents are alive) because parents 
spend more on the health of their children. The following lemma will be used in the proof of 
Proposition 2. 
 
 24
Lemma 6. Consider a junior adult with endowment h  who invests l  in his own health. When 
parameters c  and q  change, the expression  
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has a positive lower bound E  and an upper bound E smaller than 1. 
 
Proof.  Equation (5) and the conditions on the parameters imply that r  is positive and has an 
upper bound. Equation (12) shows that l  has a positive lower bound. 
Equation (12) shows that l  has an upper bound smaller than h . Thus, E  has an upper bound 
smaller than 1. 
 
The following proposition will give the changes, taking place in period 2, in the total 
population of junior adults, and in the population of workers holding, respectively, a high 
level and a low level of human capital, induced by an epidemic taking place in period 0.  
 
Proposition 2. If the reduction in the probability of survival of orphans, c−1 , and if the 
probability for an orphan to reach a high level of human capital, q , are low enough, we have 
the following results. 
a) In period 2 the total population of junior adults increases. 
b) The population of junior adults holding a high level of human capital decreases, and the 
population of junior adults with a low level of human capital increases. Thus, the proportion 
of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total population increases. 
Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases. 
c) The numbers of each kind of children and senior adults are unchanged. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. When an epidemic takes place, well-endowed junior adults will 
spend more on the health of their children. This will contribute to increasing the proportion of 
these children who will survive in period 2. However, more of these children will grow as 
orphans whose the probability of survival is reduced by a factor c−1 . If c is near enough to 1, 
the first effect will dominate and the number of junior adults alive in period 2 will be higher.  
 
In period 2, the number of junior adults who were orphans will increase and the number of 
those who were brought up by their parents will decrease. If the probability for an orphan to 
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reach a high level of human capital, q , is low enough, the number of junior adults with a high 
level of human capital, alive in period 2, will become lower. The two assumptions of 
Proposition 2 mean that orphans are more disadvantaged in their probability of reaching a 
high level of human capital than in their probability of dying before adult age.  
 
Proposition 2 is a crucial characterisation of the medium term distributional effects of ‘adult’ 
epidemics. In contrast to the epidemic only killing children, considered before, the 
distributional consequences are significant in the medium run. More young adults will get less 
educated two periods after the epidemic and output per worker goes down: the economy is 
clearly impoverished (with respect to the reference balanced growth path) at this time 
horizon7. Thus, the demographic and economic effects are clearly much more potentially 
dangerous when the epidemic hits junior adults than when it only affects children. This is of a 
course a natural outcome since adults are the working individuals in the economy. However, 
our model already makes nontrivial contributions at this stage: it neatly shows the huge 
differences between ‘child’ Vs ‘adult’ epidemics in all respects, and in particular, it forward 
puts the differences in distributional consequences, which is not treated so explicitly in the 
related literature. 
 
The analysis of periods posterior to period 2 is cumbersome. We know that, in the long run, 
the shares of junior adults holding respectively a high level and a low level of human capital 
that is the income distribution will go back to their balanced growth values. So, in contrast to 
some contributions in the AIDS-related literature (like Bell et al., 2003), the model predicts a 
kind of  corrective dynamics which will bring some key variables to the corresponding 
balanced growth corresponding values. But we cannot even conclude on the long run change 
in the total population of junior adults without further assumptions.  However, we can note 
that just like ‘child’ epidemics and for the same reasons, we have some permanent effects, 
notably on the demographic composition of the economy.  
 
5.3. A first analysis of the medium-term effects of AIDS 
AIDS mostly hits junior adults. However, many children of contaminated mothers get HIV 
and die. So, we can interpret AIDS as, first hitting the junior adults of period 0, and then 
                                                 
7 However, the share of the active population in the total population increases and we do not know if output per 
capita increases or decreases.  
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hitting their children born at the end of period 0 who become infected in period 18. Thus we 
can cumulate the analysis of the two previous paragraphs. The relative decreases in the 
populations of junior adults and of children who survive the AIDS epidemic, if health 
spending did not change, respectively are 0/)1( <− BdBβ  and 0/)1( <− AdAα . As some of 
the children of people having got AIDS survive, the second decrease should be smaller than 
the first.   
 
We will limit our analysis to the medium-run that is to the effects of AIDS in period 2. Then, 
the numbers of senior adults and children of every kind are unaffected by the epidemic. On 
one hand, the death of children in period 1 induces a proportional decrease in the population 
of both kinds of junior adults in the following period. Thus, the output per worker remains 
unchanged, but the output per head decreases. On the other hand, the death of junior adults in 
period 0 induces an increase in the total population of junior adults in period 2. The number 
of junior adults with a high level of human capital decreases; the number of junior adults 
holding a low level of human capital increases. So, output per worker decreases but the 
evolution of output per head is undetermined.  
 
One of the most robust stylised facts is that AIDS induces important diminution in total 
population in the medium-term as in the long-run. To obtain this result our model must 
assume that AIDS kills enough children and not too many junior adults. Under this 
assumption we get the following effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the medium term.  The 
numbers of senior adults and children of every kind are unaffected but the number of junior 
adults decreases.  In this last population, the proportion of people with a high level of human 
capital decreases and the proportion holding a low level of human capital increases. Finally 
output per worker and output per capita decrease. 
 
The condition under which these results are obtained, which is that AIDS must kill a large 
number of children, is unconvincing. However, AIDS also reduces the fertility of women. 
First, women die when they are in reproductive ages and secondly, women who survive 
become more cautious about having sex for fear of infection, and because as others die out of 
the workforce, female labour becomes more valuable (Young, 2005). The next paragraph will 
                                                 
8 The discretisation of time used in the model implies that children who die from AIDS die after their parents, 
actually in period 1 when their parents died in period 0. This is only a technical simplification, which excludes 
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show that assuming a decrease in fertility will keep all the previous results unchanged, but 
under more reasonable assumption.   
 
5.4. A reduction in fertility 
A junior adult living in period 0 will have, at the end of this period, a number of children 
reduced by the amount 0<dn  . In the following periods fertility will be restored to its initial 
level. According to Lemma 2 and 3 this junior adult will keep health spending on him 
unchanged. He will also keep health spending on the whole of his children unmodified. So, a 
junior adult with an endowment of human capital +h  will increase his investment in the 
health of each of his children by 0/11 >−= ++++ ndnede . The probability of survival of this child 
will increase by 0/)()1(/)()1()( 11111 >−−=−= ++++++++++ ndneedeeed λαλαλ  . 
 
The number of junior adults alive in period 2 will change in reaction to two opposite effects. 
It will tend to decrease because of the lower number of children born at the end of period 0, 
but it will tend to increase because parents will spend more on the health of each of their 
children.  We can compute the total effect by differentiating equation (21) 
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If we use equation (20) we get  
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the case when children die before their parents.   
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So, the consequence of a decrease in fertility in period 0 will be to reduce the population of 
both kinds of senior adults in period 2 and every following even period by the proportion 
ndn /α . 
  
The effects of a temporary reduction in fertility are very similar to those of an epidemic 
hitting children. The ratio between the numbers of well-endowed and poorly endowed junior 
adults will be unchanged, but the population of junior adults will be reduced by a constant 
proportion in every even period. The numbers of senior adults and of children of each 
category will be reduced by the factor ndn /α  in odd periods starting in period 3. The only 
demographic change in period 1 will be the reduction in the number of children resulting from 
the decrease in fertility. So, the share of junior adults in the total population is reduced in 
every even period and increased in every odd period. Thus, even if the domestic output per 
worker remains the same in these periods, domestic output per capita decreases in even 
periods and increases in odd periods.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the medium term effects of an epidemic, which are the effects one 
generation after the time when the epidemic started to expand to large segments of the 
population. In the medium term the number of deaths directly caused by the epidemic has 
decreased, but the economy still suffers the consequences of the epidemic, for instance 
because of the orphans who died young or lost the opportunity to receive good education. The 
effects of an epidemic will be very different if it hits children or the active population. In the 
first case, the size of the active population, its fraction of total population and domestic output 
per capita, will be depressed.  However, the composition of the active population by levels of 
education and skill will remain unchanged. In the following periods, the economy will go 
through a succession of repeated contractions in even periods and expansions in odd periods.  
 
An epidemic hitting the active population will have the opposite effects on the size of the 
active population, which will increase in the medium term. So, the fraction of this population 
in total population will expand. Moreover, in the medium term, the larger active population 
will be, in average, less educated, and its output per worker will be lower. So, output per 
worker will be depressed.  Progressively, this unbalance in the composition of the active 
population will disappear, and its average productivity will increase and converge to the level 
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it would have had if the epidemic had not taken place. This last conclusion is similar to the 
one reached by the Lucas-Uzawa model, reminded in the introduction. 
 
To analyse the medium term effects of HIV/AIDS, we assumed that the epidemic first hit 
junior adults. However, it also increases the number of deaths among children and reduces the 
rate of fertility because women die in reproductive ages or because they decide to have fewer 
children for health and economic reasons. Then, we showed that the size of total population 
will decrease in the medium term, and that the share of the active population in the total 
population will also be lower. In the active population, the proportion of people with a high 
level of human capital will decrease and the proportion holding a low level of human capital 
will increase. Finally output per worker and per capita will decrease. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
 a) The eigenvalues of matrix Β  are the roots of the characteristic equation  
0)()()( 211222112211
2 =−++−≡Λ aaaaaaS ρρ  
The discriminant of this equation is 0>∆ . So, the two eigenvalues of Β  are distinct and real. 
Their product is given by 0)0( 21122211 >−≡ aaaaS . Moreover we have  
21122211211222112211 )1)(1()()(1)1( aaaaaaaaaaS −−−=−++−≡  
As we have 21111 aa >−  and 12221 aa >− , we can conclude that 0)1( >S . Thus, the two 
eigenvalues of matrix Β  are strictly included between 0 and 1.  
 
b) We have 
( ) 21121111111112211 2/ vavavvaa +==∆++ ρ , so  
( ) 2112111122 2 vavaa =∆+−  
We also have  
( ) 2212121122 2 vavaa =∆−−  
So, a determination of the eigenvectors is given by equation (24). The two components of 1V  
are positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting 12111 =+ vv . Moreover the sum of 
the two components of 2V  is positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting 
12212 =+ vv  
 
c) We deduce from IVW =  
1)(2 211112 =−wwa  
0)(2 221212 =−wwa  
0)())(( 211121111122 =+∆+−− wwwwaa  
1)())(( 221222121122 =+∆+−− wwwwaa  
so 0
4
1
12
2211
11 >−+∆∆= a
aaw  and 0
2
1
12 >∆=w  
and 0
4
1
12
2211
21 <−+∆−∆= a
aaw  and 0
2
1
22 >∆=w  
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d) The inequalities are easy to check. For example, 1211 ww >   is equivalent to 
)(2 112212 aaa −+>∆ . A sufficient condition for this inequality is   
)(4)(4)( 11221212
2
11222112
2
2211 aaaaaaaaaa −++−>+−≡∆ , or  
22122111 aaaa +>+ , which is true.    
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 a) Let Ρ  be the diagonal matrix with elements 1ρ  and 2ρ . Then (21) can be rewritten 
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In the long run, under 1)0()0( 22 =+ −+ NN , we have 
( ) [ ]12212111112/12 )0()(/)2( wNwwvntN tt +−→+ +∞→++ ρ  
( ) [ ]12212112112/12 )0()(/)2( wNwwvntN tt +−→+ +∞→+− ρ  
This establishes directly property a).  
 
b) The dynamics of populations can be written 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]22222211212/212212111112/12 )0()()0()()2( wNwwvnwNwwvntN tt +−++−=+ +++++ ρρ  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]22222212212/212212112112/12 )0()()0()()2( wNwwvnwNwwvntN tt +−++−=+ ++++− ρρ  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]2222221221212/21221211211112/1
22
)0()()()0()()(
)2()2(
wNwwvvnwNwwvvn
tNtN
tt +−+++−+
=+++
++++
−+
ρρ  
 
We know from Lemma 4d that 01211 >> ww , and 2221 0 ww << . Lemma 4b established that 
0,, 222111 >vvv , 012 <v , and 02212 >+ vv  also hold.   
Now notice that, if )0(2+N  is decreased, then )2(2 ++ tN  should go down.  As 21 ρρ > , 
)2()2( 22 +++ −+ tNtN  drops too if 0))(())(( 2221221212112111 ≥−++−+ wwvvwwvv . The 
expressions of matrices V and W given in Lemma 4 show that the left-hand side of this 
inequality is equal to 0. However, we do not know if )2(2 +− tN  increases or decreases in the 
short run. Indeed, by the same reasoning as just before, this figure would go down if  
0)()( 222122121121 ≥−+− wwvwwv .  Unfortunately this expression turns out to be equal to 
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( )∆− 124 a , which is negative. Therefore anything could happen in the short run as for the 
number of low human capital junior adults.         
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
a) The change in the number of junior adults living in period 2, whose parents held a high 
level of human capital is, according to equation (20) 
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We use equation (36) and get 
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Equation (35) shows that ( ) 02111 >+ aad  is equivalent to 
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We use equation (12) and get 
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Lemma 6 shows that the product of the two last terms of the right-hand side has a positive 
lower bound. So, for c  near enough to 1, the inequality is satisfied. 
A similar computation shows that ( ) 02212 >+ aad . Then, equation (33) establishes part a of 
the proposition. 
b) We have 
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Equation (35) shows that ( ) 011 <ad  is equivalent to 
 36
( )( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) ( ) 011111
22
>−−
−−




−−
−−− ++++
+
++++
+
+
lrlhh
lcq
lrlhh
lcqpl πβ
α
πβ
απ  
We use equation (12) and get 
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or ( ) Elcqp cq 111 <−+ +π  
According to lemma 6, a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is 
( ) Elcqp cq 111 <−+ +π , with 1/1 >E  
For q  near enough to 0, the inequality is satisfied. A similar computation shows that 
( ) 012 <ad . Then, equation (31) establishes part b of the proposition. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
*Child mortality rate is the number of children dying before age 5 per 1,000 live births. 
Source: International Programs Center - Population Division US Bureau of the Census, 
Washington, DC
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